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This paper is concerned with the m odem  theory of agrarian economic 
relations. Unlike most other areas, this subject developed from related 
findings generated by anthropologists and empirical economists, and 
from nonspecialist accounts from the field. The theory of agrarian 
economic relations has advanced rapidly during the last decade or so and 
is one that has many interesting open questions.
The aim of this paper is to survey the field, especially relating to rural 
credit and interlinkage. The survey, however, will not be an evenhanded 
one, but somewhat idiosyncratic, focusing on ideas where there is 
something new to say or where there are interesting open questions. 
These will be interspersed with observations from the field.
Over the last several years, I, along with some colleagues and students 
specializing in development, made short visits to Nawadih, a village in 
Bihar in eastern India. The eminent anthropologist, M. N. Srinivas once 
lost all of his field notes in a fire. The detailed footnotes, statistics, and 
data, which he had collected for a book, were all gone. What emerged 
was a seminal book in anthropology, Remembered Village (Srinivas 1976). 
Since one cannot always rely on fire, in Nawadih, we took no notes, or 
hardly any. Our aim, however, was not one of producing any major work; 
wre treated the trips as a form of immediate exposure for the students and 
casual empiricism for us. We had no plans of sharing our experience with 
anyone. Yet, it is impossible to resist doing so altogether. During these 
visits we had long conversations with one small landlord—Sukur Mia.
Sukur has two bighas of land and being blind has no option but to treat 
himself as an absentee landlord. He 'chose' to lease out his land on a 
share-tenancy contract. It struck me that since we already knew the 
reasons for share tenancy given by Newbery and Stiglitz (1977), Cheung 
(1969), and Allen (1982,1985)1 it would be interesting to find out Sukur's 
reason since he had practiced what Newbery, Stiglitz, Cheung, and Allen 
had written about. The conversations turned out to be extremely 
instructive and drew our attention to the importance of 'limited liability' 
in backward agriculture and was the basis of the paper, Basu (1992).
Among the themes that run through the literature on agrarian 
relations, the most important must be the credit market. Its failure has 
been the inducement for a variety of institutions and practices. Credit has 
also been the instrument for monitoring other factor inputs and this has 
resulted in the practice of 'interlinkage' in rural markets.
As a starting point of this discussion it is useful to begin with a 
benchmark model. Hence, a model of interlinkage as a form of monitor­
ing labor inputs will be presented. This gives us a lead into the credit 
market and allows a variety of questions to be raised.
Interlinkage as an Instrument of Monitoring
Markets are said to be interlinked if the prices of two products are 
determined simultaneously and agreement to buy or sell one is predicat­
ed upon the agreement to buy or sell the other. If a landlord provides 
employment and credit to a laborer and the wage and interest are 
simultaneously agreed upon then the labor market and credit market are 
said to be interlinked. As evidence accumulated of the great importance 
of interlinkage in backward markets from anthropological sources (see 
Bardhan 1980 for a survey) and empirical economic research (Bharadwaj 
and Das 1975; Bardhan and Rudra 1978), the theoretical question as to 
why interlinkage occurs also began generating papers (Braverman and 
Srinivasan 1981; Braverman and Stiglitz 1982; Basu 1983, 1987; Gupta 
1987; Banerji 1993; Bose 1993).
One of the earliest theoretical ideas viewed interlinkage as an instru­
ment for minimizing moral hazard associated with labor.2 As is well- 
known, share tenancy has the moral hazard problem of the tenant trying 
to use less inputs, such as labor, than efficiency warrants and also than 
the landlord would want. Under circumstances, such as these, it is natural 
for the landlord to look for instruments to monitor the labor input used 
by the tenant. A number of economists (notably Braverman and Stiglitz
1982; and Mitra 1983) have argued that interlinkage may be one such 
instrument. Hence this may be a rationale for the existence of factor- 
market linkage.
The essential idea behind the model of Braverm an and Stiglitz (1982) 
is not difficult to convey. Suppose that output, X, from a plot of land 
depends on the amount of effort, e, used, and a stochastic variable, 9, 
which has expected value equal to 1. For simplicity, this can be treated as 
a multiplicative risk. Thus
X= 6 0 , / " <  0 (1)
Hence, if e is the amount of effort used, the expected output is/(e).
In this region, we shall assume, the prevalent tenurial arrangem ent is 
that of share tenancy, where the landlord's share of output is (1-a) and 
this is fixed bv custom. As we have alreadv seen, in a situation such as 
this the landlord would like to coax the tenant to use m ore effort. 
However, it is reasonable to assum e that effort cannot be directly 
monitored by the landlord, nor can it be deduced from the level of 
output. The latter is true because of the stochastic elem ent in the 
production function, which m eans that a low output m ay be the 
consequence of low effort or poor w eather resulting in a low 9.
There is, however, an indirect method of control that the landlord can 
adopt. If the tenant can be induced to take a lot of credit, then the tenant 
may be forced to work harder in order to repay the debt and, in the 
process, contribute more to the landlord's rental income. But to induce 
the tenant to borrow more, the landlord may be com pelled to lend money 
to the tenant, for instance, at a subsidized rate. And hence, the result is a 
model of interlinkage.
To illustrate this formally, assum e there are two periods. The first is the 
lean period where the tenant's (or laborer's) only consum ption is 
whatever is borrowed. In period two, the tenant keeps the designated 
share of the output, repays debts, and that determ ines consum ption. 
Thus, a tenant's utility function is
u = u{cv c2, e )
where c, is consumption in period i and e is the effort put in. If B units are 
borrowed at an interest rate i, then we could write the utility function 
more specifically as
u = n(B, a9/(e) -  (1 +i)B, e) (2)
Since the objective is to show that under some parametric configura­
tions interlinkage may occur, there is no harm if we work with a special 
utility function. I therefore assume that (2) takes the following form:
u = JB  + olQt/ F  -  (W )B  -  ke where k >  0 (3)
It is assumed throughout that the tenant will always expect to be able to 
repay the debt in period two. That is, the tenant will choose e and B so  
that
a  \[e -  (1 +i)B >  0 (4)
Hence, in the long run the tenant is able to repay the debt. This may be 
justified by the implicit assumption that there are suitable penalties for 
nonrepayment of debt.3
If we assume that individuals can borrow money freely (the source is 
not important) at an interest rate of t, then the tenant's problem is to 
maximize the expected value of (3) by choosing B and e, subject to (4). To 
solve this, first ignore (4) and maximize (3). This gives us the following 
first order conditions:
and
(5) and (6) imply
and
1 -  (1 * i)= 0
2 y i (5)
a  -  k  = 0 (6)
2 (e
B = 1 (7)
4(1+0 2
a 2c -----
4 k 2 (8)
e see that (4) would be binding if i is such that
2 (l+ /)cr  -  k <  0 (9)
Hence if (9) were true then (4) would hold as an equality and B =  cW e/(1 





Maximizing this with respect to e we get the following first order 
condition:
f  \2/3 ( \
B - 1
a











Hence, if (9) were true, the tenant's choice of B and e would be given 
by (10) and (11); and if (9) were not true, B and e would be given by (7) 
and (8). The above sentence sums up the tenant's behavior. Hence the 
landlord has to take account of it in making decisions.
Let us assume that there is a competitive credit market from which 
anybody can borrow and lend at an interest rate r. It is being assumed 
here that there is no default and no individual can influence r. In order to 
focus on this interesting case, we shall also assume
2(1+ r)a2 -  k  < 0 (12)
Now the landlord has to take a decision whether to offer a simple 
tenancy contract or a tenancy-cum-credit contract, that is, an interlinked 
contract. The purpose of this model is to demonstrate that under certain 
conditions the tenant will prefer the latter.
To work out what the landlord would choose, let us determine the 
profit to be gained if an interlinked contract is offered. Suppose that for 
entering an agreement, the landlord offers a potential tenant the opportu­
nity to borrow as much money as needed, at an interest rate of z, from the 
landlord. Of course, i has to be no greater than r because otherwise no 
tenant would borrow from the landlord. Hence the landlord's profit is
rc(z) = (1 -a )y/e -  (r-z)B, (13)
where e and B are given by (10) and (11) and not by (7) and (8), because 
i < r which implies that (9) must be true (since (12) is true).
The landlord's aim is to maximize n(i) by choosing any i < r. Using (10) 
and (11) we get
rc(z) (1 -a ) -  (r-i)
1 +/ -  ( l+ r)a a 1/3
(4k) 2/3(1 + 0 4/3
Hence,
= 0 if and only if (1 W) = 4 a  (1 + r) (X4)
If a  < 14, then / < r in equilibrium.
Note from (13) that the profit that the landlord would earn if a pure 
tenancy contract was offered is the same as the profit that would have 
been earned from an interlinked contract with i-r . Hence iz(r) is the 
landlord's profit from a pure tenancy contract. Assume a  < 14. Hence if 
i* = argmax k(l), then 7id*) > k (r) and i* <r. Hence the landlord prefers to 
offer an interlinked contract.4
By offering an interlinked deal the landlord gives credit at subsidized 
rates and thus makes a loss in this. But this loss is more than made up for 
by the extra effort that the landlord manages to eke out of the tenant by 
using this method.
There are enough assumptions in the model of Braverman and Stiglitz. 
We have added more to these in order to simplify the analysis and to 
bring out the essential idea. Some of the features, like (4), could have been 
changed but at the cost of greater complexity. W hat the above rendering 
does is to bring out an important general point. In a general equilibrium 
it may at times be in the interest of some agents to have compulsions 
imposed on them that prevent moral hazard. In other words, even though 
laborers would choose to work less, if they had the option, they may 
prefer to be forced to work more, because they end up better off (through 
the workings of the market).
Worker Sovereignty and Worker Welfare: A Digression
The final observation of the previous section is important and has policy 
ramifications that go beyond agrarian markets. This section is a digres­
sion meant to elaborate on the observation and to bring out its general 
policy importance.
Consider a competitive labor market. Purely for reasons of algebraic 
simplicity, we assume that there is only one landlord or employer and 
mimic competition by simply assuming that the landlord/em ployer is a 
wagetaker.3 If n workers are employed and each worker puts in an effort 
of c units, the employer will get a total output of X, given by
X = g(ne), g' > 0, f  < 0, 
where g  is the production function.
Suppose there are N identical workers who always prefer to be 
employed rather than unemployed. Hence labor supply is inelastic at N. 
A laborer can choose to put in any amount of effort e from within the 
feasible interval [e, ej. If e' > e", we say that at e' the laborer is working 
harder than at e". Effort or hard work here does not refer to the hours of 
work, which may be assumed to be fixed. It refers to the amount of 
efficiency or initiative that is put into the work.
The laborer's welfare depends on the effort put in and the wage 
received. Hence,
u = u(e, w), ue <  0, uw > 0
The landlord's aim is to maximize profit g(ne) - ion.
In this model, a laborer's effort is observable but, for social and political 
reasons, it may not be enforceable. Suppose, for instance, that the only 
way to force a worker to work harder is to use the threat of discharge. 
Now, if discharging workers is prohibited by law or custom then this 
threat is ineffective and clearly each worker will put in only e units of 
effort. Consider first the case where the landlord or the employer cannot 
enforce workers to put in specified levels of effort. Then his problem is 
the following:
Max g{ne) -  ionYl
From the first order condition we get
g'( ne)e = zo . (15)
Hence n= n(w). In the final equilibrium, demand for labor n(w) must be 
equal to the supply of labor. Hence, w must be such that
g'(Ne)e =  w (16)
Thus in equilibrium each laborer's welfare level is u(e^w).
Suppose now that employers are allowed to force  workers to work 
harder. At first, this looks like an antilabor change. But actually this may 
benefit the workers and workers may want to relinquish their freedom to 
indulge in moral hazard. Suppose employers compel workers to put in 
e' units of effort where e < e ' < e .  Then, in equilibrium the wage would be 
w', given by
g'(Ne')e' = v f  (17)
And each laborer's welfare would be u(e',zo'). This may well be greater 
than u(ejW). To see this, assume that
g(ne) = ane -  — (ne)2
with a, b > 0.
Hence,
g'(ne) -  a -  bne
Since in equilibrium e and w are connected by the following
g'(Ne)e = w,
we have
ae - bNe2 = iv
This is given by the inverted-U curve in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1
Let e be as shown in the figure. Then w is easily read by going vertically 
above e until the inverted-U curve as shown in the figure is reached. 
Clearly then, as e is raised to e' the workers' welfare rises above u (w, e) as 
long as e' < e*. If e happens to be less than e*, then allowing the employer 
to raise worker effort to as high as feasible, to wit e, benefits the workers. 
It results in the reduction of poverty. This exposes a policy dilemma, with 
worker sovereignty and worker welfare pulling in different directions.6
The advantage of the monitoring model discussed above, apart from 
its power of explaining interlinkage, is that it gives us a preview of many 
of the most important topics in agrarian economic relations— share 
tenancy and credit markets for example.
Tenancy
In the model of Braverman and Stiglitz (1982), the tenurial arrangement 
between the landlord and the laborer is assumed to be one of share 
tenancy or sharecropping. That makes sense because a perusal of this 
sharecropping literature suggests that explaining why share tenancy 
exists, instead of simply assum ing it to exist, may indeed be a hazardous 
venture for a researcher. Yet the question is important and, as a result, has 
generated a large literature.7
Hence, it is useful to bring inform ation from the field and to record 
recent theoretical work that explains the assum ption in the model of the 
previous section. Let us therefore return to where we left off in the 
introduction— the conversation with Sukur of Nawadih. Being familiar 
with the arguments of econom ists, I decided to ask Sukur, a practicing 
'share landlord', why he did what he did. If he gives his land on a share- 
tenancy contract instead of a fixed-rent contract, the tenant will get only 
a fraction of any additional output. So if by putting in more fertilizers or 
labor the tenant manages to eke out ten additional units of output from 
the land, Sukur would get for him self only a fraction of this, for instance, 
five units, if the share rent was half. On the other hand, if the tenant was 
paying a fixed rent he would get the full ten additional units for himself. 
Hence, if the tenant were on a fixed-rent contract, he would put in more 
inputs and innovation into land and get more output. So if Sukur 
adjusted the fixed-rent level such that it was equal to the expected rent 
under share tenancy, the tenant would be better off. Hence, under fixed 
rent, he could actually raise the rent higher without losing the tenant so 
he would be better off.
Sukur's response was that this was a region prone to droughts and 
general weather fluctuation. In bad years, no tenant would be able to pay 
the fixed rent. So the fixed rent would not work. As we cross-examined 
him  further, no doubt leading him to believe that our immense interest 
in this 'pointless' subject was evidence of some pathology on our part, it 
became clear that what he was pointing to was similar to the 'limited 
liability'' clause in the finance and banking literature (see, for example, 
Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). In years of drought, if the tenant's financial 
position drops too low then the landlord cannot collect what is contractu­
ally due to him or, in other words, every contract was underwritten by a 
limited liability clause.
In Basu (1992), I assumed this to be true, and then, checked which 
tenurial form was dom inant from the landlord's point of view. Interest­
ingly enough, sharecropping turned out to be the preferable option.
This has important implications for policy, but before going into that 
we want to briefly question whether 'limited liability'' is a reasonable 
assumption in agrarian economics. The use of this axiom is in no sense a 
novel one. Beside Basu (1992), Kotwal (1985) and Shettv (1988) have used 
it in an agrarian context. But how real is the assumption?
This is difficult to answer because there is little systematic data on this, 
one way or the other. Since many of our empirical interests arise out of 
prior theoretical interests and since limited liability in agrarian theory is 
a relatively recent idea, it is not surprising that no systematic data is 
readily available. However, whatever piecemeal evidence I have been 
able to collect, either by conversing with farmers or through reading, 
seems to confirm that landlords or moneylenders do forego their dues 
when the tenant or the borrower falls on real hard times. The pressure of 
custom seems to compel landlords and moneylenders to do so and rent 
or repayment remission are not acts of occasional altruism.
There is also reason to believe that the limited liability axiom has alsow/
been historically valid. Recent research by Atchi Reddy (1990) has 
unearthed a large number of tenancy contracts from the Nellore district 
dating back to the first half of the nineteenth century. This data source 
lends support to the belief that limited liability and bankruptcy clauses 
are not primarily the preserve of twentieth century industrialized nations 
but were often formally written into tenancy contracts in rural India.
Two examples from Atchi Reddy's rich data source may be cited. On 
21 November 1834, Konderaju Parvathamma signed a tenancy agreement, 
maktha kaul, to lease her land to Badela Pitchivadue. After specifying little 
details like 'you should cart the paddy to my residence in Nellore town 
for which the hire charges are Rs 1.00/ the landlady goes on to state, 'In 
cases of total failure of the crops due to lack of rains or floods, the tenant 
need not pay the rent but only the land revenue Rs 9.00'.3 Likewise when 
in 1868, Mula Anki Reddy leased out his 20.5 acres to Malireddy 
Ramireddy, the tenancy agreement said that 'H e [the tenant] need not 
pay anything in years of severe famines
Crossing over from Nellore in the early eighteenth century to Hereford­
shire around the same time one finds evidence of concessions in times of 
distress. To quote from the dissertation of Eric Jones (1962, 389-90):
In spells of agricultural distress most landowmers preferred to remit a 
proportion of their farm rents or to grant allowances designed to raise the 
productivity of the farms rather than reduce the nominal level of rent. This, 
they believed, would serve to placate the tenants, help them to ride out the 
depression and also have the advantage of appearing as a gratuity, the 
more prized because it might be withheld.
Again (Jones 1962, 392),
The next spate of remissions began in 1829. From early that year until early 
in 1831 there were reports of landowners remitting some of their rent, 
usually 10%, sometimes 20%, and in the case of a single farm at Much 
Marcle, 30%. These allowances were specifically made as compensation for 
the low prices of 1828, '29 and '30.
These are just a few from a variety of such exam ples quoted in Jones' 
thesis. Before moving on, observe one difference betw een Herefordshire 
and Neliore. In the former, the rent remissions seem to be discretionary 
whereas in Neliore they appear to be contractual. The difference is, 
however, not as sharp as it appears at first blush since in the Neliore 
contracts terms like 'severe fam ine' and 'total failure of crops' are not 
well-defined, thereby giving the landlord the discretion of deciding 
whether a crop failure is quite 'total'.
Now assume that the limited liability clause underlies all contracts. 
That is, no matter what contract is used, the tenant has the right to renege 
on making paym ent if the harvest fails totally. Notice that, given such an 
assumption, the tenant will have a tendency to select riskier projects 
because the failure of a project does not hurt the tenant as much as it 
would in the absence of the limited liability axiom. Since such risk taking 
will go against the landlord's interest, the landlord will try to devise a 
contract that steers the tenant to choose less risky projects and thereby 
minimizes the tension between the landlord's and the tenant's interests. 
If we consider the spectrum  of contracts from share tenancy to fixed-rent 
tenancy, via all mixtures of the two, it can be show n that it is share 
tenancv that minimizes this tension.J
From this explanation of share tenancy some testable propositions 
emerge.
1. Share tenancy is more likely in areas where output is relatively 
weather dependent, that is, where irrigation and flood control does 
not mitigate the severity of exposure to the fluctuations of the 
weather.
2. It will also be more likely in areas where technology is relatiyelvJ U J J
fixed in coefficients, that is, there is not much scope for substitution 
between land and other factors.
3. Share tenancy will tend to wither away as a region becomes well off, 
because the limited liability clause will then not have much bite 
since everybody will have enough buffer wealth not to be able to 
invoke the bankruptcy cover in the event of harvest failures.
Arguments based on limited liability also have important implications 
for poverty. Though this is not clear from the examples cited above it is 
arguable that the question of rent remission arises only when the tenant 
is sufficiently poor. In other words, even during times of drought a 
sufficiently well-off tenant would not be allowed to forego his contractual 
payments. If this were so, it seems possible that it is the wealthier tenants 
who would be more coveted because the landlords would not have to 
forego rents as easily with them as with the poorer tenants. This is not an 
argument without pitfalls because a poorer tenant may try to offset this 
disadvantage by offering a higher rent. But to the extent that rent 
variations are not always practically feasible, the poor may indeed be at 
a disadvantage. Tenancy, instead of mitigating the problem of poverty, 
may well magnify the inequities of the system.
The availability of credit can, it seems, offset some of these inequities 
of the market. However, a closer analysis of credit markets, in particular 
interventions in rural credit markets, suggests that there is a lot more that 
can be done on this front.
Credit
Credit is a subject that is closely related to limited liability and was an 
integral part of the model of Braverman and Stiglitz. In fact, the credit 
market and its distortions lie at the heart of a variety of rural practices 
and institutions.9
It is not difficult to see why credit markets function poorly. There is one 
important way in which credit transactions are different from other 
transactions and exchange. By its very nature, in a credit transaction the 
exchange is protracted over a long stretch of time. Unlike in the market 
for potatoes where with one hand you give the money and with the other 
you collect the potatoes (assuming that the readers are potato buyers 
rather than potato sellers), in the credit market the buyer of credit first 
gets the desired good (such as credit) and then after a certain lapse of 
time, which could be a few months or even a few years, pays the supplier 
the price (that is, the principal plus interest). Hence, the implicit assump­
tion in much of economics— that individuals adhere to contracts—  
becomes particularly questionable in credit markets where the borrower 
has scope for reneging on the contract and not repaying.10 This has to be 
kept in mind when commenting on rural credit markets.
One of the more enduring features of rural credit markets is that a 
formal loan, or what is alternatively called organized credit, typically
tends to elude the poorest people. There is now much systematic 
evidence on this (see, for example, Sarap 1991) and it stood out starkly 
during our field visits to the village of Nawadih. Nawadih is a village 
where one sees some presence of government. There are farmers who 
have taken government loans and sunk wells or, in the case of two 
households, obtained gobar gas plants. There are some skeleton medical 
facilities available in the nearby town of Suriya. Yet, what stands out as 
soon as one begins to get familiar with village life is that all of these 
services seem to be for the relatively better-off people. The poorest 
farmers live as i f  there were no government.11
Unlike the wealthier farmers, the poor ones are always borrowing 
money from private moneylenders with interest rates varying between 
5 and 10 per cent per month. There are two reasons for this. Formal 
lenders, like bank officials need to show on paper what the borrower's 
permanent address is, what collateral the borrower is able to offer, and 
other evidence of the loan being safe.12 These are difficult to justify in the 
case of footloose, landless, or near landless laborers and so bankers are 
unwilling to give credit because repayment is difficult to guarantee.
On the other hand, the local moneylender or landlord uses personal 
links and relationships to ensure that the borrowers, even the poor ones, 
will not be able to renege on repayment and are therefore willing to lend 
to the poorest. The second reason why the poor do not get organized 
sector credit is more surprising— they do not want it. This came out 
clearly in Nawadih and, after repeated questioning, it became clear that 
the bureaucratic hurdles and corruption involved in getting official credit 
is what thwarted the poor farmers from approaching the organized 
sector. Using data collected by Sarap (1991), we have tried to show else­
where (Basu 1990) how bureaucratic red tape is shorter for richer farmers. 
The reason for this involves issues complicated by triadic interactions.
This phenomenon— the poor relying on the free market and the better 
off using the facilities provided by the government— plays a major role 
in exacerbating problems of equity. Official data released by the Reserve 
Bank of India show that the share of organized credit in the rural sector 
has grown rapidly in India over the last few' decades.10 Given that this 
credit is available at interest rates as low as 10 per cent or even 6 per cent 
per annum  and that it is quite common all over India for the poor to get 
their credit at much higher rates of 5 to 10 per cent per month; this means 
an effective subsidy for the middle and upper class farmers. Bangladesh's 
experience suggests that if we want cheap credit not only to reach the 
rural sector, but also the poorest sections of the rural sector, then much 
more grassroots activism is needed.
Triadic Relations
In models of interlinkage, a landlord transacts with a laborer on two 
fronts— labor and credit— and the terms of each one depends on the 
other. There is, however, another way in which different markets can get 
linked together. Suppose a landless person or a marginal farmer sells 
personal labor to a landlord and borrows money from a moneylender. On 
the face of it, these are two separate transactions and there is no reason to 
expect any connection between the prices of the two transactions, to wit, 
the wage rate and the interest rate.
However, in small village communities, where everybody knows 
everybody, it may be possible for the landlord to use personal influence 
over the moneylender to threaten the laborer. For example, a laborer who 
turns down the landlord's offer will lose out with the moneylender as 
well, because the moneylender will refuse to lend. The landlord can make 
this threat effective either by threatening to cut off trading relations with 
the monevlender if the moneylender lends money to the laborer after theJ  V J
laborer turned down the landlord's employment offer, or by simply 
relying on the goodwill among the rich.
In such a situation, the labor market deal and the credit market deal do 
get linked, not via the normal interlinkage argument but via the media­
tion of a third person— in the above example, the moneylenders. Since 
such phenomena cannot occur if all interactions are two-person interac­
tions and hinge crucially on there being a third (and possibly more) 
persons, such interactions are described as triadic interactions (Basu 1986, 
1990; Platteau and Abraham 1987).
Unlike in our textbooks, triadic interactions are, in reality, extremely 
important. When the United States threatened Bangladesh that it would 
not transact with Bangladesh unless Bangladesh ceased to trade with 
Cuba (as happened in 1974), this was a case of triadic interaction. In 
international relations one sees repeated instances of this.
Likewise, this is a common phenomenon in village societies. It is easy 
not to recognize this occurrence because the threats are often such a part 
of everyday life that they do not need to be articulated and seldom have 
to be carried out; but as we tried to argue in Basu (1986), they do 
influence prices.
To understand this, suppose the landlord offers a wage of zv for a fixed 
amount of work. Will the worker accept this? The answer depends on 
what we believe will happen if the worker rejects it. In a standard model, 
if a worker rejects the wage offer, there is no interaction with the landlord 
and that is what determines the w orker's reservation utility. In a triadic
model, a worker, by rejecting the landlord's offer, risks losing out not just 
on the transaction with the landlord but with others, such as the 
moneylender, who wishes to please the landlord. Hence, the worker 
reaches a lower utility than would be reached in a textbook model. Since 
the landlord knows this, w will be set very low knowing that the worker 
will take it since the consequence of rejecting it is so drastic.
Hence triadic interactions allow for greater extortion by the rich and 
the powerful. This could also help us understand why rich borrowers get 
a better deal from banks and the officials of organized sector credit. Even 
if the village bank official has no other dealings with the village landlord 
except the giving and taking of credit, there may be 'third persons' with 
whom both the landlord and the bank official have dealings. This could 
be the local doctor, the headmaster of the school, or the village merchant. 
The bank official could get hurt via these people if the landlord is 
displeased. The interest rate cannot be varied because it is generally fixed 
by a faraway government, but the bribes can be lowered, the red tape cut, 
and the enforcement of loan repayment relaxed.
In terms of policy, the conclusions must be drawn carefully. Given the 
aberrations of the market, it would be worthwhile if government can 
intervene with optimal policies. However, one has to keep in mind that 
the government officials who have to administer and deliver the goods 
will themselves come under the pressures of the market and, depending 
on the circumstances, they could curb inequity and increase efficiency, 
but the opposite could happen as well. Government clearly cannot shake 
off its responsibility and has a major role to play in backward rural areas. 
But in designing its intervention it is important for government to realize 
that it is not immune to the bugs that caused the original distortion. Such 
awareness will improve the chances of success.
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Notes
1. For surveys of the sharecropping literature, see Singh (1989) and Taslim 
(1992).
2. For surveys of other kinds of motivation for interlinkage and the nature of 
contractual arrangements, see Basu (1990), Bell (1988), and Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig (1984).
3. If (4) holds as an equality, 'consumption' in period two is zero. This may
trouble some readers but we simply need to define 'consumption' as consump­
tion over and above subsistence. Hence zero 'consumption' means subsistence 
consumption on the right-hand side of (4). If an equivalent correction is then 
made in (2) the entire algebra remains unchanged.
4. It is often claimed that in realitv a = VY First, this is empirically contestable 
(Sharma and Dreze, 1990). Secondly, numbers, like a < 14, should not be taken 
literally. This was chosen in the model for algebraic simplicity and not for 
empirical realism. It is easy to see that the model can be reconstructed to get 
empirically realistic solutions.
5. More accurately, we assume the landlord to be a taker of the workers' 
reservation utility, u (defined below). When e is fixed, this amounts to wage­
taking behavior.
6. Fields (1993) discusses a very similar problem.
7. Apart from the references already cited, see Rao (1971), Otsuka and 
Havami (1988), Quibria and Rashid (1984), Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), and 
Bardhan (1984).
8. This is not exactly the same as the assumption that says that only that part 
of the rent will be foregone that allows the tenant to have some predetermined 
level of consumption. The author is grateful to Angus Deaton for this observa­
tion.
9. Bangladesh's successful 'credit scheme', the Grameen Bank project, was 
founded on precisely this understanding that rural credit is central to what 
happens in rural economies and to solve 'the problem of credit' would amount 
to improving overall living standards. It must, however, be pointed out that the 
Grameen Bank, as conceived by Mohammed Yunus, is more than a credit 
program; it combines some minimal effort at raising literacy, community 
development, and improving the status of women.
10. In Basu (1983) this is called 'potential risk' and interlinkage is explained as 
a direct response to this. This is also the reason for the widely observed 
phenomenon of market fragmentation in credit markets (see, for example, 
Swaminathan 1991).
11. The one exception is the employment program, Jawahar Rozgar Yojana. 
The JRY is the new name for the National Rural Employment Program, which in 
turn was the revised name of the Food for Work Program started on an all-India 
basis from 1977. The frequent changes in the name of this program is testimony 
to the fact that it has met with some marginal success and hence each new 
government, by restarting it under a new name, tries to create the illusion that 
it has initiated the program. In Nawadih, one sees the poorest people working 
on roadmaking projects under the JRY. These roads are usually so poorly 
constructed that each year after the rains the same job is once again available.
12. This need not mean that the loan is safe. The table below, consisting of data 
pertaining to formal credit, and constructed out of a larger table of Sarap (1991), 
confirms what Tipton (1976) had earlier reported from other parts of the world, 
that the largest borrowers are the largest defaulters.
The table suggests that default behavior is U-shaped with the smallest and
largest farmers being the big defaulters, which, at least on the face of it, seems to 
support Bhaduri's (1983) thesis of how the poor and the rich behave similarly to 
each other and differently from the middle class, with the poor being compelled 
to do what the rich choose to do.
S i z e  o f  b o r r o w e r ' s  lan d  
h o l d in g s  (in  a cre s )
O v e r d u e s  a s  %  o f  to ta l  
lo a n  o u t s t a n d i n g  b y  g r o u p
%  o f  lo a n  d e f a u l t e d  b y  th e  
g r o u p  to  to ta l  lo a n  d e f a u l t e d
U p  to 2 .5 7 6 11
2 .5 -5 5 4 16
5 - 1 0 19 11
10 a n d  a b o v e 81 6 2
13. The share of organized credit among all rural credit in India was 14.87 per 
cent in 1961, 29.2 per cent in 1971, and 61.2 per cent in 1981.
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